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Abstract 
Research has shown that trading decisions by individual investors are influenced by behavioural 
factors such as attention effects. The literature examining the effects of attention on individual 
trading behaviour measures attention using proxies such as abnormal trading volume and stocks 
covered in the media. These proxies do not separate the effect of trading due to changing 
fundamentals from attention-based trading. I use the distraction caused by earning 
announcements to study the effect of attention on individual trading behaviour. Consistent with 
the literature, I find that investors net buy stocks with extreme positive and extreme negative 
earnings. However, this result is only significant when investors are most attentive (least 
distracted); that is, on days when the number of competing announcements is low. On high-
distraction days when investors make the wrong trading decision initially, they amend their prior 
trading decision after a lag (delayed reaction) when they eventually observe the true earnings of 
the stock. The most active investors amend this prior trading decision before relatively non-
active investors do. The delayed reaction by active investors is not portrayed for stocks with no 
analyst coverage, as evident in consistent net buying. The results remain robust even if surprise 
is measured using analyst forecasts; announcement distractions are limited to announcements in 
similar or very different industries. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Attention is a scarce resource and individuals ignore choices that do not capture their attention. 
Davenport and Beck (2001) wrote that: 
Attention is focused mental engagement on a particular item of information. Items come into 
our awareness, we attend to a particular item, and then we decide whether to act. 
Individual investors act on seemingly similar sets of actions. Barber and Odean (2008) 
documented that decisions to buy and to sell are principally unrelated. While individual 
investors face a substantial search cost when deciding to buy stocks, they do not face the same 
problem when deciding to sell because they sell from the stocks they already hold. Therefore, 
individuals tend to restrict their choices of buying potential stocks to those that have recently 
caught their attention. Aligned with the theory of attention scarcity and stock visibility, Barber 
and Odean (2008) observed that individual investors were net buyers of stocks that caught their 
attention; whereas trading behaviour for institutional and sophisticated investors was not 
significantly related to attention. Hirshleifer et al. (2008) also observed that individual investors 
were net buyers of negative and positive earnings surprise stocks. 
In their seminal paper, Barber and Odean (2008) used several variables to identify ‘attention’. 
According to their research methodology, an attention-grabbing stock is one that is in the news, 
has high abnormal trading volume and has earned extreme one-day return. While the proxies 
used for attention are plausible, there is substantial evidence that these proxies are endogenously 
related to trading volume, thus contaminating the relationship between attention and the trading 
reactions under studied. For instance, abnormal trading volume can also surface following a 
large transaction by an institution when individual investors were not even paying any attention. 
Volume hints only at the number of shares being traded, not necessarily the number of investors 
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that participated. In addition, large trading volumes may also be driven by (i) strong favourable 
or unfavourable expectations ahead; (ii) circular trading; or (iii) institutions cutting and shifting 
positions near a derivative’s expiry. Similarly, ‘stocks in the news’ may not elicit attention if the 
relevant news is just a regular press release. Last, Barber and Odean (2008) suggested that 
substantial one-day stock price move may be a result of liquidity shortages and information-
based trading and may not constitute attention per se. These proxies do not separate the two 
trading effects from each other: (i) trading due to changing fundaments; and (ii) trading due to 
attention. 
An exogenous measure of attention must isolate attention effects from all other competing 
effects including those from changing fundamentals that determine trading reactions. I extend 
Barber and Odean (2008) using distractions created by exogenous earnings announcements as a 
measure of attention. Earnings announcements are exogenous information events rather than a 
proxy, and are thus unrelated to trading behaviour. Consequently, the effect of this attention-
grabbing event on trading volume is less noisy and more credible, enabling study of the effect of 
attention on trading with reasonable correctness.  
Earning announcements are declared in the market by each firm in a quarterly fashion. Such 
announcements, which disseminate earnings estimates for the company, are actively followed by 
investors through various forms of media. On a given day there are many announcements and a 
firm has no control over the announcement made by other firms, making the earnings 
announcement measure fairly exogenous. On days when there are many competing 
announcements, investors are more distracted but on days with fewer announcements, investors 
are more attentive and can identify the direction of earnings surprise with reasonable precision. I 
use the differential number of competing announcements on given days, which elicits different 
attention from investors, to study how attention affects trading behaviour of individual investors. 
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First, I study the trading behaviour of individual investors subsequent to a very short post-
announcement window and then I direct my consideration to differential trading behaviours 
around earning announcements to study whether investors make correct or incorrect trading 
decisions on days with varying numbers of earning announcements. In doing so, I classify 
investors into active and non-active investors and study their trading reaction separately. To 
conduct my first test, which relates to trading patterns after the announcement, I sort earning 
announcing stocks into five quintiles based on the number of other competing announcements 
on the earnings announcement day. The lower the total number of stock earnings announcements 
on a given day, the more attention paid to a particular stock because investors will be less 
distracted and more attentive to stock announcements. I call days that are in the top quintile of 
the number of competing announcements ‘high-distraction days’, unlike ‘low-distraction days’, 
which are those with the smallest number of stocks announcements. I refer to these quintiles as 
‘distraction quintiles’.1 Subsequently, I further sort these stocks based on earnings surprise 
where the top quintile has stocks with extreme positive earnings surprise and the lowest quartile 
contains stocks with extreme negative surprise. This double sorting helps disentangle 
information- and attention-derived trading reactions in response to earnings announcements, 
making it easy to individually study trading reaction to each earning distraction and earning 
surprise quintile. 
To conduct my second test, which relates to trading patterns around the announcement window, 
I again use double sorting based on the number of announcements and earnings surprise and 
study the trade imbalance for different categories of investors in short and long post-
announcement windows. However, an earnings announcement may not be noticed by all 
investors; individual investors may remain oblivious to the announcement due to time 
                                                      
1 Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) refer to these deciles as NRANK motivated from the ‘investor distraction 
hypotheses’ because on a day with many competing announcements, each stock is competing for investors’ 
attention because investors are more distracted that day. 
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constraints, limited research or failure of the announcement to capture their attention. Barber and 
Odean (2011) suggested that individual investors dedicate limited attention to investment 
decisions. Similarly, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) observed that investors are more likely to 
trade on stocks following an earnings announcement if the announcement was broadcast by local 
media. To differentiate the trading behaviours of active and all other investors, I divide investors 
into different classes based on the frequency of trades and amount invested. The unique dataset 
enables me to continuously observe trade positions for every investor for every day, thus making 
the above analysis easier to conduct. With the analysis also conducted in a regression setting, I 
aim to study how active and non-active investors make different trading decisions on days with 
high and low earnings announcement distraction in short and long post-announcement windows. 
The results support established findings that individuals are net buyers of stocks with both 
extreme positive and extreme negative earnings surprise. In addition, I found that net buying is 
only significant when individuals are most attentive—that is, on low-distraction days—because 
on those days, investors are most attentive. On the rest of the days, trading behaviour remains 
insignificant. On days with higher announcement distraction—when investors are least 
attentive—they have negative buy–sell imbalance (IMB), signifying more selling than buying. 
Moreover, I also found that most investors, especially active investors, make correct2 trading 
decisions (in the direction of earnings surprise) when they are highly attentive. However, on 
days when they are most distracted, they make incorrect trading decisions and later correct those 
decisions after a lag when they eventually realise the true direction of earnings surprise. This 
delayed reaction is most prominent for stocks with extreme negative surprise on high-distraction 
days. For such stocks, active investors initially net buy, because due to the high degree of 
distraction, they cannot decipher the true direction of a stock’s earnings surprise. However, after 
                                                      
2 In this thesis, ‘correct trading decision’ refers to trade in direction of earnings surprise; for example, if the earnings 
surprise is positive (negative) then buying (selling) is presumed to be the correct trading decision leading to positive 
(negative) buy–sell imbalance (IMB). 
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a few days, they begin selling these negative surprise stocks when the true direction of the 
earning announcement is registered, displaying a delayed reaction. The results also show that for 
stocks with no analyst coverage, the IMB does not decline subsequent to a negative surprise 
announcement. For such stocks, active investors rely on attention-based trading rather than 
trading in response to changing firm fundamentals. The delayed reaction and correction of initial 
incorrect trading is not displayed by non-active investors, who continue to net buy the negative 
surprise stocks even two weeks after the announcement. 
The contribution of this research is twofold: 
• It documents the effect of attention on trading volume by using an exogenous 
information event—that is, earning announcements—and testing the hypothesis posed by 
Barber and Odean (2008) that individual investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing 
stocks. I do this in light of an attention-grabbing event of earning announcements and 
competing announcements by other firms during the same period. 
• By linking trading volume to earnings announcement distractions, I aim to study the 
differential trading decisions for individual investors under different levels of exogenous 
attention caused by varying the numbers of earnings announcements each day. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Investor Trading Behaviour 
Individual trading behaviour has been extensively studied in finance, mostly in relation to 
variables such as stock price, stock volatility and past performance. The finance literature seeks 
to study these relationships separately for individual and institutional investors. Griffin et al. 
(2003), in their cross-sectional study, made inferences about the differences in institutional and 
investor trading behaviour based on a stock’s historical returns, a stock’s persistence in trading 
and return predictability. The authors reported contrasting results for both sets of investors: 
following abnormal return, top performance stocks are more likely to be purchased in net by 
institutions but sold by individual investors than are those stocks with lowest performance. 
Moreover, the study documented a positive and negative relationship between trading activity 
and stock returns for institutional and individual traders, respectively. These studies also report 
herd behaviour portrayed by individual investors. De Long et al. (1990) suggested that herding is 
motivated by a uniform information set from individual investors, whereas other authors such as 
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994), and Hong and Stein (1999) have identified 
slowly diffusing private information as an explanation for herd behaviour. Research usually 
focuses on momentum investing and herd behaviour by examining quarterly changes in 
institutional ownership, and has concluded that the degree of momentum strategy or trend 
chasing varies with the proportion of institutional ownership. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) found 
evidence of positive feedback trading and herd trading among Korean investors but contrarian 
trading by individuals in the short term. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) showed that Finnish 
individual investors are generally contrarian whereas foreign investors resort to momentum 
trading. Huang (2010) observed that investors are more inclined to hold stocks for an industry if 
their previous investments in that industry outperformed the market. Shapira and Venezia (2006) 
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showed that for professional investors in Israel there is a positive (negative) correlation between 
stock market returns and total trading activities, while herd trading is stronger for amateur 
investors. 
The finance literature also includes examination of the predictability of institutional and 
individual trades in relation to subsequent returns. Odean (1999) reported that stocks bought by 
individual investors underperform relative to the stocks they sell; however, Coval, Hirshleifer 
and Shumway (2005) concluded that individuals with good past performance earned superior 
returns. Odean (1999) discovered that individual traders trade ‘too much’ and subsequently earn 
lower returns owing to high transaction costs. They showed that the average household earned 
9% basis points per month lower than the value-weighted market index. Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) identified overconfidence as a culprit in excessive trading as investors 
that are overconfident also tend to overestimate the value of the public information they hold. 
This result was verified by Dorn and Huberman (2005) and Glaser and Weber (2007). Graham, 
Harvey and Huang (2009) considered that excessive trading is a direct result of investors’ 
competence and familiarity with ‘investment products, alternatives and opportunities’. Barber et 
al. (2009) and Gao (2002) believed that underperformance by individual investors is due to 
asymmetric information. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) refuted the findings of those studies by 
reporting sensation seeking and hedonistic motives as the reason behind excessive trading. 
Studies linking human psyche to trading have also explained excessive trading. Barber and 
Odean (2000) observed that men trade more often than do women and thus earn a lower return 
although both underperform with respect to the market index. Feng and Seasholes (2008) 
performed a similar gender-based study with Chinese investors and found that after controlling 
for stock ownership, stock turnover of men and women remained the same and that they earned 
identical returns. Kumar (2009) documented that, unlike institutional investors, individual 
investors are more inclined to invest in stocks that have lottery-type features. Kumar noted that 
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demand for lottery-like stocks—defined as those with higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher 
skewness and lower price—increases during economic downturns, affecting the returns of such 
stocks. Investors who are more inclined to invest in these stocks usually underperform and come 
from socially and economically destitute backgrounds. 
Odean (1999) noted that individual investors also sell stocks that were past winners and hold on 
to losing stocks, leading to a disposition effect. This phenomenon was first documented by 
Shefrin and Statman in 1985. Since then, it has been demonstrated for different periods and 
datasets and for heterogeneous investors with different investment objectives from different 
economies (Barber et al. 2007, Taiwan; Calvet, Campbell & Sodini 2009, Sweden; Feng & 
Seasholes 2008, China; Grinblatt, Keloharju & Linnainmaa 2012, Finland). The possible causes 
of the disposition effect include regret avoidance (Barber & Odean 1999), the loss aversion in 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1973) and mental accounting (Thaler 1985). Barber et al. 
(2007) showed that the effect is strongest for individuals although it exists to varying degrees for 
all institutional investors. Shapira and Venezia (2001) noted that the disposition effect is 
stronger for self-managed accounts and weaker for professionally managed accounts. Chang, 
Solomon and Westerfield (2015) also showed that the disposition effect is reversed for delegated 
assets—for example, mutual funds—because cognitive dissonance is lower for such assets, 
allowing the investor to blame a fund manager’s poor stock selection for the bad performance. 
Weber and Camerer (1998) showed that the disposition effect disappears when investors are 
forced to sell all their positions and then repurchase. Feng and Seasholes (2005) suggested that 
trading experience and investor sophistication help mitigate the disposition effect. 
2.2 Inattention and Stock Visibility 
Pashler, Johnson & Ruthruff (2001) suggested that the central cognitive-processing capacity of 
the human brain has it limits. Therefore, processing multiple information events simultaneously 
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is difficult for the human brain, causing it to remain oblivious to events that do not call for 
attention. Gabaix et al. (2003) reported the first empirical test in the field of economics of an 
economic model of endogenous attention allocation. In a laboratory setting, the authors 
simulated a decision as a scarce resource and continuously measured subjects’ responses. After 
comparing the subjects’ responses with attention allocation choices predicted by tractable 
attention allocation models based on cost–benefit analysis, the authors concluded that the 
subjects assigned thinking time when the economic gains of such thinking was higher. 
The finance literature reports research on the phenomena of attention-grabbing stocks and 
investor inattention from two perspectives: (i) how a firms stock price and return predictability 
changes due to inherent investor inattention; and (ii) how investor trading behaviour relates to 
inattention. The results are very similar when examining the same problem from the viewpoint 
of firms and investors. 
Damodaran (1989) and Penman (1987) asserted that firms are more likely to make bad earnings 
and dividends announcements after the close of trading on Friday, to give investors enough time 
to absorb the shock. As a result, Fridays are associated with more negative abnormal returns 
than any other weekday. Bagnoli, Clement and Watts (2005) suggested that Friday 
announcements of poor performance are related not only to managers’ desire to take advantage 
of limited media attention on Friday but also to several aspects of investors’ anticipation and 
behaviour. Dellavinga and Pollet (2009) documented that market reaction to Friday 
announcements reaps a delayed response because investors are more distracted on Fridays than 
on any other trading day, and thus underreact. When investors revisit their decisions in 
subsequent periods, information is eventually incorporated in stock prices, causing greater drift 
and gradual reversal of the initial underreaction. In support of these results, Hirshleifer, Lim and 
Teoh (2009) showed that price and volume reaction to earning surprise is weaker and coupled 
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with higher drift when a greater number of earning announcements is also made by other firms 
on the same day. 
Pioneering studies in finance by Merton (1987), Miller (1977) and Mayshar (1983) suggested 
that stock with unusual trading commands higher premiums due to a sudden increase in stock 
visibility. Barber and Odean (2008) concluded that individuals are more likely to purchase 
attention-grabbing stocks than to sell them. This happens because buying is typically related to 
attention: investors deciding to buy stocks seemingly buy stocks that have recently caught their 
attention. In contrast, during selling decisions, investors’ choice sets are smaller as they only sell 
stocks they already own. As selling creates less of a search problem, it is less sensitive to 
attention effects. Barber and Odean observed exactly what they hypothesised: individual 
investors are net buyers on attention-grabbing days. On the other hand, institutional investors’ 
buying behaviour was not influenced by attention as they expended sufficient time and skill to 
research the best candidate stock to buy, irrespective of attention. Peng and Xiong (2006) 
provided a theoretical model of investor inattention to conclude categorically that investors tend 
to process more market-wide and sector-wide information and are relatively inattentive to firm-
specific information. This inattention causes asset-return co-movement: that is, correlation 
between returns of various firms is higher than correlation between their fundamentals. Da, 
Engelberg and Gao (2011), by using the frequency of Google searches as a measure of investor 
attention, showed that higher search frequency is related to higher stock prices in the two weeks 
following and an eventual reversal within an year. 
Seasholes and Wu (2007) observed that individual investors on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
net buy stocks the next day if they hit an upper price limit. By regarding this upper limit as an 
attention-triggering event, the authors showed that the imbalance is greater when multiple stocks 
hit their upper price limit on the same day. Investors that had never owned stock before were 
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more motivated to buy stocks once they hit the upper price limit. The authors also observed that 
price reverted back to pre-event levels in a trajectory fashion 10 days after the event, causing 
institutional investors to make returns at the expense of individual investors whose trading 
decisions are driven by attention.  
Several studies have documented how investor attention is triggered by the higher visibility due 
to media. Dyck and Zingales (2003) observed that stock prices following earning 
announcements are most reactive if the earning announcement is widely emphasised in the 
media. The effect is stronger for firms with less analyst coverage when more credible media 
centres are present. Similarly, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) observed that following an earnings 
announcement, individual investors are more inclined to trade stocks on the S&P 500 if the 
announcement was covered in a local newspaper. Engelberg, Sasseville and Williams (2012) 
studied the overnight reaction to buy–sell recommendations for the stocks covered on the 
television show Mad Money. They observed that the reaction is greater when the viewership of 
Mad Money is higher. They also suggested that first-time buy recommendations reap higher 
returns than do first-time sell recommendations. Huberman and Regev (2001) noticed that a 
news story on the potential development of a cancer-curing drug in the New York Times created 
a huge return for the company’s stocks although the same story had previously been reported in 
the science journal Nature, and Times magazine five months previously. Thus, it is the public 
attention and not ‘new information’ per se that causes a permanent rise in share prices. Cohen 
and Frazzini (2008) exploited the customer–supplier links between firms to study the effect of 
investor inattention on stock prices of firms following news about linked firms. The authors 
observed that when investors are attentive to ex ante customer–supplier links, the prices for a 
partner firm adjust when news about its linked firm is disseminated to the market. However, if 
investors ignore this economic link between firms, any news about the partner firm causes a 
lagged reaction in stock prices of a linked firm. Therefore, there exists predictable co-movement 
 12 
between stock prices of economically linked firms in the case of limited attentive investors: 
prices adjust with a lag causing predictability in returns. 
2.3 Earnings Announcement and Earnings Surprise 
The literature on earnings and earnings announcements is substantial; it examines the effects of 
earnings on variables such as stock price, trading volume, announcement premium and market 
reaction including post-earnings-announcement drift. Earnings announcements provide 
exogenous variation through which researchers can effectively study the effects of changing 
fundamentals or beliefs on various economic outcomes. Therefore, earnings announcements are 
widely used in the financial literature to decipher such relationships. According to the efficient 
market hypothesis, stock price should readily reflect the news contained in corporate 
fundamental announcements of earnings and dividends. However, the literature concurs that 
stock price is relatively unresponsive to movements in stock fundamentals. Shiller (1981), in his 
simple efficient market model of stock price, observed that stock prices are too volatile to be 
explained by dividends. Fama et al. (1969) were the first to test responsiveness of stock price to 
corporate events involving stock splits. Similarly, earnings announcements present another 
mechanism widely followed by investors that can be used to test the laws of market efficiency. 
In efficient markets, stock price following earning announcements should be driven by earnings 
surprise. Stock price reacts positively to positive earnings surprises and negatively to negative 
earnings surprises for United States (US) companies (Ball & Brown 1968; Chari, Jagannathan & 
Ofer 1988; Gennotte & Trueman 1996). Beaver (1968) performed the seminal study of the effect 
of earnings announcements on stock price and volatility. He documented that trading volume 
and return volatility increased at the time of earnings announcements. Ball and Brown (1968) 
were the first to classify earnings surprises as good and bad. They suggested that the market 
underreacts to earnings announcements. 
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With respect to the concept of post-earning announcement drift (PEAD) following positive 
(negative) surprises, the drift upwards (downwards) is consistent with the earnings momentum 
strategies posed by Bernard and Thomas (1990). Kothari (2001) noted the existence of two 
categories of explanations for drift: ‘(i) bias caused by design and measurement issues; and (ii) 
market inefficiency because investors process information slowly and inefficiently’. Ball and 
Brown (1968) were the first to discuss the concept of PEAD. Subsequently, many studies have 
examined drift (e.g., Bernard & Thomas 1990; Foster, Olsen & Shevlin 1984; Francis et al. 
2007). Ball and Brown (1968) studied the effects of corporate income on security prices and 
inferred that stock price does not incorporate all relevant information rapidly; it gradually 
adjusts to new information many days after information release. Bernard and Thomas (1989) 
demonstrated that drift, inversely related to firm size, continued for 60 days and became 
insignificant after that. Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984), who focused on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and American Express, proposed similar results. 
More recent research by Francis et al. (2007) and Shivakumar (2007) has shown that drift still 
exists as a phenomenon. They believed that this is because the future will forever remain 
uncertain. Gerard (2012) reported similar results for a sample of European companies. Using 
idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for information uncertainty, he showed that idiosyncratic 
volatility has a significant effect on abnormal returns and trade volume. Brav and Heaton (2002) 
hypothesised that drift exists because information uncertainty magnifies information uncertainty 
across investors, leading to higher transaction costs. This affects traders’ ability with respect to 
arbitrage, and thus price reaction. 
Frazzini and Lamont (2007) demonstrated that announcement premium—that is, buying stocks 
in companies that are expected to announce their earnings over the subsequent month and 
shorting stocks for companies that are not expected to announce—earns a return of 60 basis 
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points per month. They also noted that the announcement premium is quantitatively large for 
large cap companies and the firms with the largest predicted volume increases in announcement 
months. Savor and Wilson (2016) presented a risk-based explanation for this premium. They 
believed that, at announcement times, the covariance between firm-specific and market cash 
flow news is augmented, increasing risk for the announcing firm and leading to a large premium. 
Welker and Sparks (2001) studied individual and institutional trading around earning 
announcements for NYSE traders. He found no statistically significant relationship between 
individual trading before an announcement and subsequent returns. However, Vieru, Perttunen 
and Schadewitz (2006) found that net trading by very active Finnish institutional traders three 
days prior to an earnings announcement was positively related to abnormal returns five days 
following the event. These results did not hold for any other sub-class of investors, including 
institutional investors. Hirshleifer et al. (2008) documented that individual investors are net 
buyers following both negative and positive extreme earnings surprises, meaning that trading by 
individuals does not explain the drift. However, Kaniel et al. (2012) found that individuals are 
news and return contrarian, thus proving that they are somewhat responsible for the drift. 
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development 
The human mind has cognitive limits and, due to selective attention, can only process a certain 
amount of information; it ignores the rest. In human and animal studies, it has been observed 
that certain receptors in the mind react only to cues that incite attention towards the cue due to 
certain stimuli. In psychology, substantial clinical evidence has shown that it is difficult for 
humans to process information from multiple sources or perform multiple tasks simultaneously. 
Baker et al. (1993) showed that cue competition occurs. They studied how subjects learn about 
the predicted values of a variable that is stochastically related to multiple cues. They showed in a 
series of laboratory experiments that subjects use less and less of the relevant signals when the 
arrival of an irrelevant signal is high. This means that not only does our mind remain oblivious 
to signals that do not call for attention, but we tend to also overlook relevant information when 
there is a great deal of information overall. 
Investors who use public fundamental information including earnings announcements to forecast 
a firm’s future prospects actively face a large quantity of information signals over time. They 
filter out irrelevant signals and focus on attention-grabbing information. When many events 
happen in the previous few days, on a given day a newspaper must publish a larger number of 
news articles with an issue of numerous pages. In that case, there is a strong chance that the 
readers of the newspaper will not notice many articles that would interest them. Similarly, on 
days when many stock earnings announcements are released into the market, investors may not 
observe the earnings of the stock that they hold or stocks that interest them the most. Because of 
the many signals in the market on such days, investors will be highly distracted and will not be 
attentive to all stock announcements. In contrast, on a day with only a handful of 
announcements, investors will be more attentive and will observe the earnings of the stock and 
its direction with reasonable precision. 
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One of the most revolutionary models in psychological sciences is the Pearce–Hall Model, 
which explains how the degree of attention paid to a signal determines learning and possible 
responses. Pearce and Hall (1980) reported that more attention is generally paid to signals that 
are followed by a surprising outcome than to signals that are followed by a dull or unsurprising 
outcome. The model has immense implications for the current study because it demonstrates 
how extreme events elicit strong trading reactions. The literature notes that individual investors, 
due to their constrained attention and limited optimal stock search resources, are net buyers of 
attention-grabbing stocks. This means that these investors net buy stocks not only with extreme 
positive earnings surprise but also extreme negative earnings surprise, as both of these extreme 
surprises attract the most attention from individual investors (Barber & Odean 2008). News 
reported in the Wall Street Journal or Financial Times attract the attention of individual 
investors irrespective of the nature of the event. Barber and Odean noted that when deciding to 
buy a stock, an individual investor selects stocks that capture their attention but when deciding 
to sell a stock, they usually sell from the stocks they hold. Therefore, attention affects buying 
decisions more significantly than selling decisions, making individual investors more likely to 
buy attention-grabbing stocks than to sell them. If trade imbalance is a credible proxy for 
individual investor activities, the evidence for a positive IMB following both negative and 
positive earnings surprise but on high attention days suggests that such trading is a direct result 
of attention. 
Further, an attention-related interpretation also entails that on days with many stock 
announcements, investors are overburdened by the enormous amount of information that has 
accumulated throughout the day; therefore, they take more time to decipher the true direction of 
an earnings surprise to make a reasonable trade against the surprise. Della Vigna and Pollet 
(2009) reported that investors underreact and trade 10% less on Mondays because of information 
overload that has accumulated over the weekend due to the large number of Friday 
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announcements. In light of these two related pieces of evidence, it is expected that investors 
faced with earnings announcements on a day with a small number of competing announcements 
will conduct more significant trading than on days with a large number of announcement 
distractions. Hence: 
H1: Net buying in extreme positive and negative earnings is significant on days with low 
announcement distractions; that is, when investors are most attentive to announcements. 
Psychological evidence regarding individual trading behaviour also suggests that on days when 
there is information overload due to irrelevant information, stock investors are more likely to 
underreact to relevant information about a firm. However, over time as factors become clearer to 
them, they have more accurate information and amend their previous decision. Several studies 
on PEAD have laid the foundation based on a similar intuition; that, subsequent to earnings 
announcements, investors initially underreact and then overreact, causing drift. In the current 
setting, if investors are inattentive to some stock earnings announcement on high-distraction 
days, they may not react as intensely to these announcements, leading to a more pronounced 
drift in prices. 
This means that on days with many competing announcements (when investors are highly 
distracted), investors that make incorrect trading decisions will amend those decisions after a lag 
when they register the true direction of the earnings announcement (delayed reaction): 
H2a: On high-distraction days, active investors display a delayed reaction to earnings 
announcements; that is, they subsequently amend their earlier trading choice after a lag. 
In particular, this behaviour is more pronounced for stocks with extreme negative 
announcements. On low-distraction days, individual investors that are initial net buyers of 
extreme negative earnings surprise stocks due to their attention-based trading will subsequently 
decrease their buying of that stock a few days after the announcement when the direction of 
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earnings surprise is clearer. In this research, which classifies investors into active and non-active 
(general and high-capital) investors, it is reasonable to assume that trading subsequent to an 
initial underreaction would be different for both types of investor. Following an announcement 
on a high-distraction day, active investors because of their frequent trading would determine the 
true direction of earnings surprise earlier than their non-active counterparts. Non-active 
investors, because of their less frequent trading, will not quickly capture the trading behaviour of 
other market participants and stock price reactions; therefore, they will remain oblivious to the 
true direction of earnings surprise for a few more days than active investors. This implies that 
following an announcement on a high-distraction day, the most active investors would correct 
their trading decisions earlier than those who are relatively non-active and trade less frequently. 
Thus: 
H2b: On high-distraction days, the most active investors realise the true direction of earnings 
surprise earlier than do relatively non-active investors, making them correct their earlier 
trading decision before their non-active counterparts. 
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Chapter 4: Data, Methodology and Results 
The aim of this thesis is to study the trading behaviour of individual investors around earnings 
announcements; therefore, data on individual trading and stock fundamentals are obtained. I use 
the following two datasets: 
• Data on individual investors is obtained from a large discount brokerage firm. Data 
comprise investments trading and position records of around 78,000 individuals from 
January 1991 to December 1996. The records regarding positions are available until 
December 1996, whereas the trading records are available until November 1996. The 
data include trading and position records for all households that opened and managed 
their accounts through the discount brokerage that compiled this dataset. The dataset also 
contains investment records for mutual funds, American depository receipts, options and 
warrants but I do not include them in my analysis. My focus is solely on the purchase 
and sales of common stocks, which comprise almost 60% of trades in all trades in 
securities, amounting to more than three million trades. As of December 1996, these 
individual investors had their investments in common stocks worth US$4.5 billion. 
During the period 1991–1996, there were more purchases (~$1,082,107) than sales (~$ 
887,594). The average value of stocks sold (~$13,710) was also marginally greater than 
the value of stocks bought (~$11,205). Consequently, the cumulative value of purchases 
was around $12.1 billion and of sales, approximately $12.2 billion. The average trade 
was transacted at a price per share of $31. The total trade value and the transaction price 
of trades displayed positive skewness, with the median values for purchases and sales 
being substantially less than the mean values. The dataset comprises tens of thousands of 
investors and is a fairly good representation of an average US investor. This dataset has 
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been used in numerous studies including those of Barber and Odean (2000), Chang, 
Solomon and Westerfield (2016), Kumar (2009) and Odean (1999). 
• Data on stock earning announcement dates, earnings per share and stock price are 
obtained from the COMPUSTAT database. 
I begin my analysis by sorting each individual earnings announcement into quintiles based on 
two criteria: 
• Earnings surprise calculated using a random walk model (standardised unexpected 
earnings [SUE]):3  
SUE !" =  𝐸𝑃𝑆!" − 𝐸𝑃𝑆!"!!𝑃!"!!  
In this model, EPSiq and EPSiq-4 are firm i’s earnings per share (EPS) before 
extraordinary items in quarters q and q−4, respectively. Piq-4 is the stock price in the q–4 
quarter. Note that q is the quarter in which firm i announces its earnings.4 After sorting 
the earnings announcements into five quintiles, the lowest surprise quintile (S1) has 
stocks with extreme negative earnings and the highest surprise quintile (S5) has stocks 
with extreme positive earnings. 
• Number of announcements on the same day. Every day I calculate the number of stock 
announcements and then classify every individual stock announcement based on the total 
number of announcements that day. For instance, the lowest distraction quintile (D1) are 
stocks with announcements on days with the fewest other competing announcements, 
whereas the highest quintile (D5) refers to days with many announcements, which are 
regarded as high-distraction days. 
                                                      
3 See Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984). 
4 The literature succinctly documents ample evidence that individual investors base their trading decisions on 
historical estimates; therefore, in most of my analyses, SUE is calculated using a random walk model. This measure 
also maximises the number of observations. 
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Then, for every earnings announcement, I compute the IMB separately for pre-announcement 
and post-announcement windows for individual traders: 
𝐼𝑀𝐵!"# = 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"# − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!"#𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"# + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!"# 
where 𝐼𝑀𝐵!"# = IMB for an individual i, stock j in an event window t; 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠!"# = purchases 
made by an individual i, for stock j in an event window t; and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!"# = sales made by an 
individual i, for stock j in an event window t. 
I conduct my analysis around and after the earnings announcements. Principally, I define the 
date of an earnings announcement for a stock as t = 0 and then measure the trade imbalance for 
different event windows ‘t’. The pre-announcement analysis examines windows t = –15 to t = –
1. The post-announcement analysis examines short-term and long-term post-announcement 
windows, which are as follows: 
• For the ‘short’ post-announcement window, I examine t = 0 to t = +3 
• For the ‘long’ post-announcement window, I examine t = +4 to t = +15. 
 
To test H1, I conduct stock-level analysis for individuals and investors. I sort the stocks every 
day into attention and earnings surprise quintiles. This double sorting helps to separate the effect 
of trading due to attention from that of changing fundamentals. For every stock and investor, I 
calculate the IMB for every distraction quintile in a three-day short post-announcement window 
[0, +3]. 
Pre-Earnings	
Announcement	
t	=	-	15	to	t	=	-1	
Earnings	
Announcement	
t	=	0	
Post-	
Announcement	
(short)	Window	
t	=	0	to	t	=	+3	
Post-	
Announcement	
(long)	Window		
t	=	+4	to	t	=	+15	
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Following Barber and Odean (2000) and Hirshleifer et al. (2008), I control for investor 
sophistication and experience by separating investors into sub-classes. ‘Active’ investors are 
those who conduct more than 48 trades in a year. ‘High-capital’ investors have more than 
$100,000 of invested wealth at any given time. ‘General’ investors are all other investors. To test 
H2a and H2b, I calculate the imbalance for stocks sorted into different distraction and surprise 
quintiles. I do this separately for active, general and high-capital investors in the pre-
announcement window [–15, –1] and both short-term and long-term post-announcement 
windows; that is, [0, +3] and [+4, +15], respectively. 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics obtained for the individual investor trading dataset 
maintained by the investment brokerage house. Panel A shows the main statistics for the 
purchases data and Panel B details the statistics for the sales activity of individual traders. There 
are slightly more purchases than sales because individual investors are inclined to buy stocks as 
opposed to selling them, due to short-sale constraints. The monthly turnover for purchases is 
higher than that for sales. On average, sales and purchases are conducted at the same price per 
share, of around $32. However, the mean size of sales is larger than the mean size of purchase 
transactions ($13,808 vs. $11,120). The distributions of both sales and purchase data are 
positively skewed because the mean is greater than the median for both categories. 
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
Table 2 shows the trading statistics in dollars and the number of trades for total investments in 
common stocks. The amount in dollars is the average amount invested per investor year for an 
investor class and the amount shown in parenthesis is the number of trades per investor year. 
The sub-categories of investors were explained in the previous section. As expected, active 
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investors conduct the highest number and volume of trading. On average, active investors trade 
39 stocks per year with a transaction size of $577,043. This is considerably larger than trades 
conducted by non-active investors (i.e. general and high-capital investors). In particular, high-
capital investors trade 9 stocks per year on average. This amount is even lower for general 
investors, at 6 stock trades per year. In terms of the dollar volume of trade, general and high-
capital investors follow similar patterns: on average, their trade size is $52,220 and $105,623 per 
year, respectively. 
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
4.2 Results: Univariate Analysis 
To test H1, I first sort stocks daily based on earnings surprise and distractions. The stocks are 
independently sorted into five quintiles based on earnings surprise and distractions separately. 
Table 3 shows the imbalance for stocks in the [0, +3] post-announcement window for all 
investors. Panel A shows results of stocks sorted based on earnings surprise where the lowest 
quintile S1 contains stocks with extreme negative earnings stocks and the highest quintile S5 
contains stocks with extreme positive earnings stocks. The results support claims previously 
established by Barber and Odean (2000) and Hirshleifer et al. (2008) in that individuals are net 
buyers for both extreme positive and extreme negative earnings stocks. Panel B shows stocks 
sorted into five quintiles based on the number of other announcements on a given day 
(distractions). It is clear that net-buying is only significant and positive in first two quintiles 
where investors are assumed to be more attentive because the number of competing 
announcements on low-distraction days is low. The magnitude of imbalance falls monotonically 
from D1 to D5 and becomes negative for D3 onwards. This lends partial support to Barber and 
Odean’s (2000) claim that individuals are net buyers of attention stocks. However, these single 
sorts do not explain what individual traders do separately for negative and positive earnings 
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stocks on low- and high-distraction days. To understand the bigger picture, I double sort stocks 
based on earnings surprise and distractions. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
Table 4 shows the net buy–sell in the [0, +3] post-announcement window after a double sort 
based on earnings surprise and announcement distractions. The results lend support to H1 as the 
net buying in the extreme negative S1 and extreme positive earnings S5 quintiles is significant 
only in low-distraction quintiles D1 and D2. In quintiles D3 onwards, when investors are 
relatively less attentive, the imbalance is insignificant. Also, the imbalance falls monotonically 
from D1 to D5. The differential imbalance for distraction (i.e., D5–D1) is significant and 
negative in almost all earnings surprise quintiles. Also the differential imbalance for surprise 
(i.e., S5–S1) is significant only for the first two distraction quintiles, D1 and D2. Therefore, H1 
is supported by these results as net buying behaviour is significant only in the top distraction 
quintile; that is, on days when investors are most attentive. 
<Insert Table 4 Here> 
I now test the claim stated in H2a to decipher trading behaviour separately for different 
categories of investors in pre- and post-announcement windows. Table 5 shows the net 
imbalance for these windows for stocks with extreme negative earnings (S1) and extreme 
positive earnings (S5), in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Panel A shows that when investors 
are least distracted (D1), active and high-capital traders are net sellers on pre-announcement 
days, long before the negative earnings announcement was made. This might be because they 
infer earnings information that is yet to be released, from sources such as historical information 
or analyst forecasts. Subsequently, both active and high-capital traders continue to sell more in 
the short post-announcement window [0, +3] and long post-announcement window [+4, +15] 
after the announcement. However, general investors are mostly net buyers in all three windows. 
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In Panel A, when investors are highly distracted (D5), only the most active investors are net 
selling the negative surprise stocks in the pre-announcement window. Due to high distraction, all 
investors make incorrect decisions in the short post-announcement window [0, +3] and are net 
buyers. However, active investors correct their decisions in the long run and sell those stocks in 
the long post-announcement window [+4, +15], displaying a delayed reaction to stock 
announcements on days with high distraction and thus lending support to H2a. 
<Insert Table 5 Here> 
Table 5 Panel B shows the net imbalance for different windows for stocks with extreme positive 
earnings (S5). When investors are most attentive, all are net buyers of positive earnings surprise 
stocks in the pre-announcement window [0, –3]. Subsequently, in both short post-announcement 
[0, +3] and long post-announcement windows [+4, +15], all active and non-active investors are 
net buyers of positive earnings stocks. In Panel B, on high-distraction days, high-capital 
investors make incorrect decisions in net selling in both the short post-announcement [0, +3] and 
long post-announcement windows [+4, +15]. However, only active and general investors make 
correct trading decisions5 and are net buyers of positive earnings stocks in both the short and 
long post-announcement windows. 
4.3 Results: Baseline Regression 
The results in Table 5 show that the active investor category is the only one that displays 
significant reversal of prior trading decision on days with high announcement distractions. Not 
only do active investors make correct trading decisions several days prior to the forthcoming 
earnings announcement, but they also correct their prior trading. This amendment of prior 
trading decisions, displaying a delayed reaction on days with high distraction, is possibly due to 
                                                      
5 In this paper, ‘correct trading decision’ refers to trade in the direction of the earnings surprise: for example, if the 
earnings surprise is positive (negative) then buying (selling) is presumed to be the correct trading decision leading 
to positive (negative) IMB. 
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earnings announcement information overload that makes it difficult for active investors to 
accurately predict the direction of earnings surprise. In contrast, the high-capital and general 
investor categories do not closely follow earnings surprise to make or amend their trading 
decisions, and their trading behaviour is close to random. For brevity and further analysis, I run 
the stock-level model in a regression framework in which I regress the dependent variable IMB 
on surprise quintiles, standardised distractions, their interactions and other firm-level controls. 
The regression specification (1), which sums up stock-level imbalances in the short post-
announcement window [0, +3] for different investor categories is as follows: 
𝐼𝑀𝐵!" =  𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑆1 !" + 𝛽! 𝑆5 !" + 𝛽! 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 !" + 𝛽!(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" × 𝑆1!") +𝛽!(𝑎𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" × 𝑆5!") + 𝛽! 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑇𝐵 !" + 𝛽! 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑉𝐸 !" + 𝜀!"  (1) 
where 𝐼𝑀𝐵!" = IMB for stock j in an event window t; S1 = extreme negative earnings surprise 
quintile; S5 = extreme positive earnings surprise quintile; Standardised Distraction = the value 
calculated by subtracting the total number of announcements on a given day from the mean 
number of monthly announcements, divided by the standard deviation of the mean monthly 
announcements; Log (MTB) = log of the firm’s market-to-book value ratio; Log (MVE) = log of 
the firm’s market value of equity; t = event window, that is, –15 to –1 for pre-announcement, 0 
to +3 for short post-announcement and +4 to +15 for long post-announcement window, with 
reference to day 0 on which earnings are announced. 
<Insert Table 6A Here> 
Table 6A presents the baseline regression (I) results where stock-level imbalances are calculated 
separately for active, non-active and all investor categories in the short post-announcement 
window (0 to +3). Earnings distractions are calculated using a random walk model computed 
using all announcements made on a given day for all stocks. The coefficient of standardised 
distraction is negative for active investors, showing that as the number of competing 
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announcements increases—which makes active investors more distracted—their IMB falls. As 
higher buying than selling is an indication of more attention, it is clear that on high-distraction 
days, active investors display less attention-based buying behaviour. Moreover, the results 
remain similar if I take into account negative or positive earnings surprise because the 
interaction terms are also negative and significant, suggesting that as distraction increases, IMB 
falls too, as active investors conduct less buying. Non-active investors appear more distracted 
when earnings surprise is positive and distraction increases. Interestingly, not considering the 
direction of earnings surprise, non-active investors also appear distracted (coefficient = –0.0585) 
as the number of announcements increases. The results in Table 6A lend direct support to the 
double sorting results in Table 4, in that as distraction increases, IMB falls. 
<Insert Table 6B Here> 
Table 6B reports regression results in which IMB in the short post-announcement (0 to +3 days 
after announcement) (Panel A) and long post-announcement window (+4 to +15 days after 
announcement) (Panel B) is regressed on standardised earnings surprise using SUE, earning 
announcement distraction, their interactions and firm-level control variables: 
𝐼𝑀𝐵!" =  𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝑆1 !" + 𝛽! 𝐷1 !" +  𝛽! 𝑆5 !" + 𝛽! 𝐷5 !" + 𝛽! 𝑆1 × 𝐷1 !" + 𝛽! 𝑆1 × 𝐷5 !" +  𝛽! 𝑆5 × 𝐷1 !" + 𝛽! 𝑆5 × 𝐷5 !" + 𝛽! 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑇𝐵 !" + 𝛽!" 𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝑉𝐸 !" + 𝜀!"  (2) 
where D1 = least earnings announcement distraction quintile; and D5 = highest earnings 
announcement distraction quintile. 
In Panel A on low-distraction days, active investors are net sellers when earnings surprise is 
negative but on days with high distraction, active investors make the incorrect trading choice of 
net buying (coefficient = 0.0740). In contrast, other investors are net buyers of negative surprise 
stocks on both low- and high-distraction days. For positive earnings surprise stocks, all active 
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and non-active investors conduct significant net buying in the short post-announcement window. 
Panel B shows that active investors over the long post-announcement window conduct 
significant net selling of negative surprise stocks even on high-distraction days (coefficient = –
0.0730). This is in contrast to active investors’ previous net buying of negative surprise stocks 
on high-distraction days during the short post-announcement window (coefficient = 0.0740). 
This means that active investors who make the incorrect trading decision to net buy negative 
surprise stocks over the short post-announcement period reverse their decision over the longer 
post-announcement period by selling those stocks as the information regarding correct earnings 
surprise becomes clearer. This is in contrast to other investors who remain net buyers of negative 
surprise stocks on high-distraction days over the long post-announcement period (coefficient = 
0.889) and fail to change their previous incorrect decisions. However, for stocks with positive 
surprise, all investors are net buyers on both low- and high-distraction days. 
<Insert Table 7 Here> 
Table 7 shows the results for a slightly different specification than the baseline regression (I) to 
enable a comparison between the trade imbalance in the pre-announcement window (–15 to –1) 
with the trade imbalance in the short post-announcement window (0 to +3): 
𝐼𝑀𝐵!" =  𝛽! + 𝛽!(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1)!" + 𝛽!(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟)!" + 𝛽!(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟!" × 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1!") +𝛽!(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟!" ) +  𝛽!(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟!" × 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑1!") + 𝜀!"  (3) 
where 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 is a dummy for the short post-announcement window (0 to +3). 
First, in specification (3), the pre-announcement window (–15 to –1) is the base category making 
the short post-announcement window (0 to +3) the test category or Test Period 1. Second, 
without adding controls for earning surprise categories, I double sort stocks based on earnings 
and distraction quintiles and regress them separately, as shown in Table 7. 
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Columns 2 and 3 in Table 7 show results for extreme negative stocks (S1) divided into a low-
distraction (D1) and high-distraction quintile (D5). Columns 4 and 5 shows results for extreme 
positive stocks (S5) divided into a low-distraction (D1) and high-distraction quintile (D5). 
Examining column 2, it is evident that active investors have negative imbalance in both the pre-
announcement and short post-announcement windows (i.e., Test Period 1). However, this does 
not hold true for high-distraction days in column 3; that is, for days with many announcements, 
active investors net buy negative surprise stocks primarily because they are too distracted to 
decipher the correct earning surprise. Similarly, general investors make correct trading decisions 
only on days with low distractions or announcements. Results for high-capital investors are not 
significant. In column 4, when the surprise is positive and on low-distraction days, active and 
general investors both make correct trading decisions to net buy these stocks in both the pre- and 
short post-announcement windows. However, high-capital investors make the wrong decision to 
net sell positive announcement stocks even on days with both low and high distraction. Last, in 
column 5, general and high-capital investors net sell positive earnings surprise stocks on high-
distraction days but active investors make the correct decision to buy these stocks even during 
the pre-announcement period, with an imbalance of 0.121. Even in the three days following the 
announcement, active investors still make the correct decision to net buy positive earnings 
surprise stocks. 
4.4 Further Tests 
4.4.1 Evolution of Trading of Extreme Negative Surprise Stocks (S1) by Active Investors 
on High-Distraction Days (D5) 
The analysis in Table 5 Panel A shows that active investors make incorrect trading decisions on 
the days with the highest number of competing announcements (D5) and extreme negative 
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earnings surprise (S1). In particular, active investors have a positive imbalance of approximately 
0.1818 in the short pre-announcement window, that is, three days after the earnings 
announcement, even when the earnings surprise is negative. Subsequently, within 15 days, their 
imbalance is corrected to –0.226, suggesting a significant net sell of negative surprise stocks in a 
display of delayed reaction. This is possible because following days with the most competing 
stock announcements, active investors take a few days to identify the correct direction of 
earnings surprise and subsequently correct their prior incorrect trading decision for those stocks. 
<Insert Table 8 Here> 
In Table 8, I use only the active investor data and test hypothesis 2B to investigate how many 
days ‘most active’ and ‘least active’ active investors take to reverse their original incorrect 
trading decision when announcement distractions are highest and earning surprise, lowest. Based 
on the number of trades conducted per year, I divide active investors into 10 deciles, where the 
top deciles contain the ‘most active’ active investors, who conduct the highest number of trades 
among all active investors. The last or 10th decile has the ‘least active’ active investors, who 
conduct the highest number of trades among all active investors. By construction, active 
investors are those that conduct more than 48 trades in a year. After classifying the active 
investors into 10 deciles, it appears that the top decile of active investors conducts more than 70 
trades per year and the bottom decile of active investors conducts 47–54 trades per year. IMB 
for these decile categories of investors is calculated on every successive day after 
announcement, including the day of announcement (t = 0) itself; the results are reported in Table 
8. Examining the top decile of most active investors in column (I), it is clear that on days with 
high distractions, they net buy extreme negative earnings surprise stocks for the first six days, on 
which the imbalance is positive. From the seventh day, the imbalance becomes negative, when 
they begin to net sell the stocks. However, from the results, it is clear that the biggest drop in 
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positive imbalance occurs between day 2 and day 3, when the imbalance falls by around 47% 
from 0.1543 to 0.0813, the highest drop for this category. Therefore, it is clear that the top decile 
of active investors takes two days following an announcement to decipher the signal regarding 
the direction of earning surprise, and becomes net sellers after day 7. In column (II), the results 
are reported for the lowest decile of active investor; the highest relative drop in positive 
imbalance occurs between day 8 and day 9 but they only start net selling the negative surprise 
stocks from day 10. On average, all active investors decipher the direction of earning surprise 
five days after the announcement but net sell the stocks starting from day 8. Therefore, it is clear 
that the topmost decile of highly active investors takes the shortest time (i.e., two days) to 
reverse their incorrect trading decision on days with the largest numbers of other competing 
announcements; however, the lowest decile takes longer than average active investors to reverse 
their prior trading decisions. Figure 1 presents similar findings graphically. It is clear that the 
topmost decile of active investors reverse their trading decision in three days subsequent to the 
announcement. This decile is the quickest to identify the direction of earnings surprise in days of 
high distractions. Similarly, the imbalance for the bottommost decile takes around eight days 
after the announcement to begin declining swiftly. On average, the imbalance for all active 
investors in total begins declining five days after the announcement. 
From the above results, it clear that active investors begin to net sell negative surprise stocks as 
soon as they recognise the true earnings of the stock. For further analysis, I investigate the 
trading evolution of the topmost decile of active investors for stocks that are more likely to be 
inefficiently priced, or stocks for which information regarding earnings surprise cannot be 
readily obtained. To do this, I use stocks with no analyst forecast and study their trading 
evolution on high-distraction days following negative earnings announcements. I superimpose 
the trading evolution of such stocks on trading evolution for stocks with analyst coverage. 
Figure 2 shows the results: the top line depicts trading for stocks with no analyst coverage and 
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the bottom line is trading evolution for stocks that are covered by analysts. It is clear that for 
stocks with no analyst coverage, IMB does not fall drastically and investors continue to net buy 
these stocks. In contrast, for stocks that are covered by analysts, the IMB starts declining two 
days after the announcement and investors commence reselling the stocks from day 7 onwards. 
When the analyst dispersion is too high (i.e., for stocks with no analyst coverage), attention-
based buying is significant, as evidenced by the consistent net buying of active investors. In 
contrast, for stocks with low analyst forecast dispersion, active investors pay more attention to 
firm fundamentals. This results support those established by Hirshleifer et al. (2008) that there 
are significant net purchases after bad news for stocks with low price and no analyst forecast. It 
is clear that for stocks that are likely to be inefficiently priced, attention-based trading is more 
evident than for stocks that are relatively efficiently priced, for which active investors trade 
more rationally and subsequently display a delayed reaction. 
4.4.2 Robustness Tests 
4.4.2.1 Alternative Definition of the Earnings Surprise Measure 
In the previous section, I observed that trading response of active investors to earnings 
announcements of stocks with and without analyst coverage differ considerably, in that active 
investors not only pay more attention to firm fundamentals if stocks are covered by analysts but 
also display delayed but correct reaction to negative surprise stocks following high-distraction 
days. These results necessitate analysis of trading reactions if earnings surprise is measured 
using different metrics, to determine if the results are robust to the choice of metric. Most active 
investors regularly follow the forecasts and recommendations issued by analysts, to pre-empt the 
forthcoming earnings and to make a decision either to hold or trade a stock. I repeat the previous 
analysis with earnings surprise calculated using analysts’ forecasts as follows: 
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Standardised Unexpected Earnings Using Analyst Forecast SUEAF !"
=  𝐸𝑃𝑆!" − (𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 90 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠)𝑃!"!!  
For standardised unexpected earnings using analysts’ forecasts, the difference between actual 
EPS reported in I/B/E/S dataset and the median of the most recent analyst forecasts over the 90 
days prior to the earnings announcement is scaled by q−4 quarter-end stock prices, Piq−4. There 
are two drawbacks of using SUEAF: (i) using analyst forecast measures to calculate the earnings 
surprise means that the metric only reflects the surprise relative to the opinions of analysts and 
thus does not incorporate information provided by other well-informed market participants; and 
(ii) it is mostly large firms that are covered by analysts, so using this measure leads to loss of 
observations due to unavailable data for many small firms. 
<Insert Table 9 Here> 
The results of the new analysis are shown in Table 9. With both low and high distraction, active 
investors net sell negative surprise stocks in the pre-announcement window. Interestingly, 
general traders make the correct decision to sell negative surprise stocks on high-distraction 
days. In contrast, with positive earnings surprise stocks and high distraction, general traders 
make the wrong decision initially to sell the stocks but subsequently, after 15 trading days, they 
became net buyers. Active traders seem to make the right decisions on both high- and low-
distraction days and the results for high-capital investors are insignificant. In conclusion, the 
results obtained using analyst forecast earnings surprise are fundamentally the same as the 
results obtained from the random walk measure of earnings surprise. 
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4.4.2.2 Intra-Industry and Inter-Industry Distraction Analysis 
Many investors may view distraction as all other announcements only in the industry for which 
they hold a stock. In all of my previous analyses, distractions on a given day consist of all the 
announcements that occur on a specific earnings announcement day. For instance, on the day of 
announcement, a technology stock is assumed to be affected by earnings announcements in all 
technology and non-technology stocks from the same day. It may be intuitive that investors 
holding stocks in a technology firm do not view announcements of agricultural stocks as a 
distraction, primarily because they do not view those stocks as a potential investment or do not 
choose to transfer their investments from the technology industry. In the next analysis, I restrict 
distractions to a particular stock on its announcement day stemming only from all other 
announcements in the same industry to which the particular stock belongs. The distraction 
quintiles are based on announcements in the same industry on a given day. Industries are 
classified using the six-digit North American Industrial Classification System. 
<Insert Table 10 Here> 
Table 10 shows IMB for intra-industry (same industry) distractions for negative and positive 
surprise stocks in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. In Panel A, it is clear that the results 
remain quantitatively similar even with intra-industry stock distractions. Active traders, for 
instance, make correct decisions to sell negative earning stocks in both high- and low-distraction 
pre-announcement windows; however, they again display a delayed reaction for negative 
earnings stocks on high-distraction days. General traders also make correct trading decisions. 
In Panel A and B of Table 11, I calculate inter-industry distraction analysis by restricting 
distraction to a particular stock on its announcement day, stemming only from all other 
announcements in an industry that is distinct from that to which the stock belongs. Again the 
results remain similar in that active investors make correct decisions when they are least 
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distracted. The trading patterns for general and high-capital investors remain insignificant in 
most test windows. 
<Insert Table 11 Here> 
Similarly, Panel B of Table 11 charts the results for extreme positive earnings stocks for intra-
industry distraction. None of the results contradict the previous main results. Active, high-capital 
and general investors are net buyers of positive surprise stocks with both high and low intra-
industry distraction; only active investors display significant trading patterns. For extreme 
negative earning surprise stocks, Active investors in short window are net sellers but are net-
buyers in longer post announcement window (coefficient = 0.1939). This signifies that when 
looking at inter-industry distractions, all investors make similar trading decisions in long run. It 
can also be averred that inter-industry or announcement in unrelated industries are not much a 
cause of guiding trading decisions for investors therefore they have a significant net purchase of 
stocks in long post-announcement window.   
4.4.2.3 Investor Subset Holding Announcing Stock in Pre-Announcement Window 
It is possible that the results are driven by investors who did not previously hold a stock but later 
buy or sell the stock because of a favourable or unfavourable announcement. For instance, the 
net IMB may be overestimated because of inclusion of new investors who previously did not 
own a stock but later own it due to changing fundamentals or changing visibility. Due to the 
inclusion of such new stock investors, the results for trading reaction following earnings 
surprise—for investors that already held the stock on pre-announcement days—may be 
imprecise. Thus, I aim to study the trading reaction for those investors that already owned the 
stock before an announcement, to observe how they conduct trading following the 
announcement. In this section, I use the subset of investors that held the announcing stock in the 
pre-announcement window and observe how they change their holdings in the post-
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announcement window. Any investors that buy or sell stock in the post-announcement window 
but did not previously hold that stock in the pre-announcement window are eliminated from this 
analysis. Therefore, the analysis carves out pure distraction-based results for all investors who 
held stock and are now responding to earnings announcements. 
<Insert Table 12 Here> 
Panel A of Table 12 shows the IMB for extreme negative earnings stocks on high- and low-
distraction days. Active traders make the correct decision to sell the stock in the pre-
announcement window on both high- and low-distraction days but resort to net buying in the 
longer post-announcement window (i.e., 15 days after announcement). Both general and high-
capital traders make the wrong decision in that they buy negative surprise stocks throughout 
both the pre- and post-announcement periods. 
Panel B shows IMB for positive earnings stocks on high- and low-distraction days. Both active 
and general traders make the correct decision in both pre- and post-announcement windows; 
whereas, high-capital traders have insignificant results. 
  
 37 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The results of this thesis show that when active investors are most attentive they trade in the 
correct direction of earnings that are yet to be announced. Not only is this trading behaviour 
correct on pre-announcement days, this also holds true for post-announcement days. Individual 
investors not only buy more than sell, but they actively do so when they are most attentive or 
when the earnings elicit the highest attention; that is, extreme positive and negative earnings on 
days with least distraction. The results shows that indeed individuals are net buyers of attention-
grabbing stocks but this relationship is only significant on days when other competing stock 
announcements are low; that is, on high-attention days. On high-distraction days, individual 
investors also have a negative IMB, signifying less attention-derived buying behaviour relative 
to selling behaviour. Moreover, on high-attention days, individual investors make correct trading 
decisions; that is, they net buy subsequent to positive earnings surprise and net sell subsequent to 
negative earnings surprise. This relationship is, however, different on days with high earning 
announcement distractions. The results suggest that most investors make incorrect trading 
decisions if the earnings are announced on high-distraction days. For instance, on high-
distraction days, active investors initially net buy following negative earnings surprise but over 
time when the correct signal about earnings is realised, they net sell and amend their earlier net 
buying decision. In contrast, general and high-capital investors do not correct their prior 
incorrect trading decision of net selling even 15 days after the positive earnings announcement 
and remain oblivious to it because their infrequent trading behaviour does not help them in 
recognise the true earnings quickly. To summarise, on high-distraction days, investors make 
contrasting trading decisions in short and long post-earnings-announcement windows and 
reinforce their original trading decision if the initial trading decision was correct. Otherwise, 
they amend their initial trading decision if it was incorrect initially as a result of high distraction. 
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Further, the analysis shows that on high-distraction days when active investors make the wrong 
trading decision initially for stocks with negative surprise, the most active active investors 
amend their prior decision earlier than do active investors who are relatively non-active and 
trade less frequently. The frequent trading conducted by active investors helps them to recognise 
the true earnings surprise subsequent to an earnings announcement, leading them to amend their 
prior decision to net buy negative surprise stock and to net sell in a display of delayed reaction. 
Such delayed reaction and amendment of prior trading decisions is also not displayed by active 
investors for stocks that are inefficiently priced; for example, stocks with no analyst coverage. 
For such stocks, consistent net buying is stronger, possibly due to trading motivated by attention. 
For stocks covered by analysts, active investors pay more attention to firm fundamentals and 
trade in response to these changing fundamentals. Moreover, a delayed reaction is not displayed 
by general and high-capital investors, whose trading pattern subsequent to earnings 
announcement is rather random. 
The results remain robust when earnings surprise is measured using analyst forecasts. The 
results also remain robust if the distraction measure is defined as distractions only from 
announcements in a similar or different industry to which the stock belongs. Investors who 
invest in announcement stocks as their new investments do not drive the results. That is, 
restricting the investors to those that held stocks in the pre-announcement window does not 
change the results. In all these experiments, the baseline results hold.  
In conclusion, it is worth reiterating that individual investors are indeed challenged by attention 
bias when making trading decision. A mechanism that can cause individual investors to 
accurately observe the release of stock fundamental information would enable them to make 
better informed trading decision when faced with information overload. As an extension, a study 
can be conducted to investigate how demographics and socioeconomic factors such as age, 
 39 
occupation and gender of individual investors affect their behavioural bias.  Furthermore, it 
would be worth investigating how informed investors e.g. institutional investors make trading 
decision in high and low distraction environments due to high number of fundamental 
information release. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Purchases and Sales Made by Individual Investors 
The table reports summary statistics for the purchases (Panel A) and sales (Panel B) of common 
stocks made by individual investors. Monthly turnover is calculated as market value of shares 
purchased or sold in month t – 1 divided by total market value of shares held in month t. 
Price/share is the average transacted price of purchase (or sales) of common stock weighted by 
number of stocks purchased (or sold). Size of trade is the total dollar amount of purchases or 
sales conducted by all investors. 
Panel A 
Purchases 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Observations 
Monthly turnover 
(%) 
6.51 2.7 10.9 66,245 
Price/share ($) 32.3 23.1 118.2 1,082,107 
Size of trade ($) 11,120 5,100 32,200 1,082,107 
Panel B 
Sales 
 Mean Median Standard deviation Observations 
Monthly turnover 
(%) 
6.25 2.5 11.4 65,475 
Price/share ($) 32.1 23.8 112.8 887,595 
Size of trade ($) 13,803 5,643 38,200 887,595 
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Table 2: Average Dollar Amount and Number of Trades per Investor Year by Investor 
Class 
The table reports the summary statistics in dollar amount and number of trades for total 
investments in common stocks. The amount in dollars is the average dollar amount invested per 
investor year by investor class. The amount shown in parenthesis is the number of trades per 
investor year. Investors are classified as ‘active’ (those who conduct more than 48 trades in a 
year), ‘high-capital’ (those with more than $100,000 of invested wealth at any given time) and 
‘general’ investors, who are all remaining investors. 
Investor type Mean Median Number of 
investor–years 
Percentage of 
Trade to Total 
Trade 
Active  $577,043 
 
(38.65) 
 
$449,038 
 
(46) 
33,068 74% 
General  $52,220 
 
(6.15) 
 
$14,428 
 
(3) 
189,512 8% 
High-capital  $105,623 
 
(8.65) 
 
$158,276 
 
(22) 
52,482 18% 
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Table 3: Single Sort: Net Buy–Sell Imbalance (IMB) in Short Post-announcement Window 
[0, +3] 
The table shows net buy–sell in [0, +3] post-announcement window after a single sort by 
earnings surprise (Panel A) and announcement distraction (Panel B). Earnings quintile S1 
represents extreme negative surprise stocks and S5 represents extreme positive surprise stocks. 
Distraction quintile D1 represents the stock with the lowest competing announcement and D5 
represents the stock with the highest competing announcement. For the t-statistics *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
Earnings quintile Observations IMB mean IMB standard 
deviation 
t-score 
S1 (highly negative) 14,399 0.0729 0.4172 2.10** 
S2 14,112 –0.0247 0.4501 –1.25 
S3 13,608 0.0249 0.4731 1.23 
S4 13,496 –0.0189 0.4518 1.37 
S5 (highly positive) 14,337 0.1124 0.4374 3.21*** 
Panel B 
Distraction quintile Observations IMB mean IMB standard 
deviation 
t-score 
D1 (lowest distraction) 14,412 0.151 0.4328 4.16*** 
D2 15,178 0.0123 0.4312 3.52*** 
D3 14,259 –0.0014 0.4464 –0.39 
D4 14,047 –0.0045 0.4283 –1.15 
D5 (highest 
distraction) 
12,056 –0.0046 0.4552 –1.12 
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Table 4: Double Sort: Net Buy–Sell Imbalance in Short Post-Announcement Window [0, 
+3] 
The table shows net buy–sell in the [0, +3] post-announcement window after double sorting the 
stocks by earnings surprise and announcement distraction. Earnings quintile S1 represents 
extreme negative surprise stocks and S5 represents extreme positive surprise stocks. Distraction 
quintile D1 represents the stock with the lowest competing announcement and D5 represents the 
stock with the highest competing announcement. For the t-statistics *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 Distraction quintiles 
 
 
 
 
Earnings 
surprise 
quintiles 
 D1 (lowest 
distraction) 
D2 D3 D4 D5 (highest 
distraction) 
D5 – D1 
S1 (highly 
negative) 
0.0234* 0.0248*** 0.0062 –0.0001 0.0021 –0.0214** 
S2 0.0122* 0.0019 –0.0109 –0.0148 –0.0125 –0.0247** 
S3 0.0079 0.0036 –0.0192** –0.0057 0.0026 –0.0053 
S4 0.0332** 0.0118 –0.0078 –0.0091 –0.0161* –0.0493*** 
S5 (highly 
positive) 
0.0360*** 0.0164** –0.0124 0.0087 0.0011 –0.035*** 
S5–S1 0.126*** –0.0084** –0.0187 0.008 –0.0010  
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Table 5: Net Buy-Sell in Pre- and Post-announcement Windows: Random Walk Earnings 
Surprise 
The table reports the net buy–sell in the pre- and post-announcement windows for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks S1 and extreme positive earnings surprise stocks S5, in Panel 
A and Panel B, respectively. The low-distraction quintile D1 contains stocks with announcement 
on days with the lowest number of other competing announcements and the high-distraction 
quintile D5 contains stocks with announcement on days with the highest number of other 
competing announcements. Earnings surprise is calculated using a random walk model. The 
‘before’ event window is a pre-announcement window of [–15, –1] days before the earnings 
announcement; the ‘short’ post-announcement event window is [0, +3] days after the earnings 
announcement; and the ‘long’ event window is [+4, +15] days after the earnings announcement. 
For the t-statistics *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
 (A)  (B) 
 Extreme negative earnings surprise 
stocks (S1)  
 Extreme positive earnings surprise 
stocks (S5) 
Active 
traders 
High–
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Active 
traders 
High–
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Event 
window 
 
 
Lowest 
distraction 
quintile 
(D1) 
Before [–15, 
–1] 
–0.0658* –0.1869 0.1847***  0.2057** 0.1826 0.2025** 
Short [0, +3] –0.1875 –0.1412 0.0983  0.1460** 0.1332* 0.2550*** 
Difference 
(short –
before) 
–1.2177** 0.2257 –0.0864**  –0.1547** –0.0498* –0.1725*** 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–0.2353 –0.0741 0.2028  –0.1951** 0.1261 0.2615 
Difference 
(long – 
before) 
–0.1695 0.2929 0.0181***  0.1065** –0.0565 0.2090** 
         
 
 
Highest 
distraction 
quintile 
(D5) 
Before [–15, 
–1] 
–0.0489 0.1674 0.1268**  0.1824*** 0.2723 0.0651** 
Short [0, +3] 0.1818 0.2341 0.2692*  0.1563 –0.1624 –0.1905 
Difference 
(short –
before) 
0.2308 0.0667 0.6424**  –0.0262*** –0.8347* –0.2556** 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–0.2257** 0.1632 0.1429  0.0173 –0.2591  0.1075 
Difference 
(long – 
before) 
–0.2168* –0.7042 0.0160**  –0.1651** –0.9314 0.2757* 
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Table 6A: Baseline Regression I 
The table shows results of stock-level buy–sell imbalance in a short post-announcement window 
(0 to +3 days after announcement) regressed on standardised earnings surprise using a random 
walk model (SUE), standardised earning announcement distraction, their interactions and other 
control variables. Earning surprise is calculated using the random walk model; S1 and S5 
corresponds to extreme negative earnings surprise and extreme positive earnings surprise, 
respectively. The standardised distraction score is calculated by subtracting total number of 
announcements on a given day from the mean monthly announcement, divided by the standard 
deviation of the monthly announcements. Log (MTB) is the log of the firm’s market-to-book 
value ratio and log (MVE) is the log of the firm’s market value of equity. Standard errors are 
clustered for investor types. For the t-statistics shown in parenthesis, *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 All investors Active 
investors 
Other investors 
S1 (extreme negative earnings surprise) 0.0558* –0.0931* 0.0772* 
S5 (extreme positive earnings surprise) 0.2203* 0.1664** 0.2069** 
Standardised distraction –0.0581* –0.0097** –0.0585* 
S1 × (standardised distraction) –0.0198* –0.0157** 0.0331 
S5 × (standardised distraction) –0.0455** –0.0113*** –0.0828* 
Log (MTB) 0.0827 0.0369 0.1357* 
Log (MVE) 0.0629* 0.0967 0.1031 
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Table 6 B: Baseline Regression II 
The table reports regression results in which stock-level buy–sell imbalance in the short post-
announcement (0 to +3 days after announcement) (Panel A) and long post-announcement 
window (+4 to +15 days after announcement) (Panel B) is regressed on standardised earnings 
surprise using a random walk model (SUE), earning announcement distraction, their interactions 
and other control variables. Earning surprise is calculated using the random walk model and S1 
and S5 correspond to extreme negative earnings surprise and extreme positive earnings surprise, 
respectively. The distraction quintiles are based on all announcements on a given day. Log 
(MTB) is the log of the firm’s market-to-book value ratio and log (MVE) is the log of the firm’s 
market value of equity. Standard errors are clustered for investor types. For the t-statistics shown 
in parenthesis, *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively 
Panel A: Short post-announcement window 
  Active investors Other investors 
S1 (extreme negative earnings surprise) –0.0964* 0.1959 
D1 (lowest distraction) 0.1430* 0.2023* 
S5 (extreme positive earnings surprise) 0.1086** 0.1227** 
D5 (highest distraction) 0.1603* 0.1683 
S1 × D1 –0.0930** 0.1309* 
S1 × D5 0.0740* 0.1534 
S5 × D1 0.1974** 0.1625* 
S5 × D5 0.1066** 0.2103** 
Log (MTB) 0.0311 0.0641 
Log (MVE) 0.1343 0.1220 
Panel B: Long post-announcement window 
  Active investors Other investors 
S1 (extreme negative earnings surprise) –0.0665* 0.1399 
D1 (lowest distraction) 0.1209** 0.1846* 
S5 (extreme positive earnings surprise) 0.0928**** 0.1438** 
D5 (highest distraction) 0.2092 0.2135 
S1 × D1 –0.1538** 0.0913* 
S1 × D5 –0.0730* 0.0889** 
S5 × D1 0.1372** 0.1402* 
S5 × D5 0.1292** 0.1542** 
Log (MTB) 0.1168 0.1451 
Log(MVE) 0.1549 0.1131 
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Table 7: Baseline Regression III: Double Sort on Earnings Surprise and Announcement 
Distractions 
The table shows regression results for specification (3) in which stock-level buy–sell imbalance 
(IMB) in the short post-announcement window (0 to +3 days after announcement) is regressed 
on period dummies, investor types and their interactions. Test Period 1 is the short post-
announcement window (0 to +3 days after announcement) with the base period category of pre-
announcement window (–15 to –1 days before announcement). Stocks are double sorted based 
on earnings surprise and announcement distractions. Columns 2 and 3 show results for extreme 
negative stocks (S1) divided into lowest (D1) and highest distraction quintile (D5). Columns 4 
and 5 show results for extreme positive stocks (S5) divided into lowest (D1) and highest 
distraction quintile (D5). Earning surprise is calculated using a random walk model and S1 and 
S5 correspond to extreme negative earnings surprise and extreme positive earnings surprise, 
respectively. The distraction quintiles are based on all announcements on a given day. Standard 
errors are clustered for investor types. For the t-statistics shown in parenthesis, *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable IMB IMB 
 Extreme negative surprise (S1) Extreme positive surprise (S5) 
 Lowest distraction 
(D1) 
Highest 
distraction (D5) 
Lowest 
distraction (D1) 
Highest 
distraction (D5) 
Test Period 1 (0 to +3) –0.1672 -0.0927** 0.2192** –0.1992* 
 (–1.25) (2.928) (2.742) (–1.657) 
Active investor –0.0829* 0.1354* 0.2391*** 0.121* 
 (–1.93) (1.762) (3.139) (1.802) 
Active investor X Test Period 
1 
–0.1034** 0.0623* 0.1953*** 0.0813* 
 (–2.44) (1.892) (2.832) (1.782) 
High-capital investors 0.1923 0.1928 0.2019 –0.2192 
 (1.152) (1.321) (1.042) (0.8832) 
High-capital investors x Test 
Period 1 
–0.1271 0.2938 –0.2331* –0.1723 
 (–0.881) (1.362) (–1.928) (–1.283) 
Intercept 0.1643*** 0.1238 0.1935** 0.1838* 
 (3.029) (1.547) (2.378) (1.843) 
     
Adjusted R2 1.27% 1.30% 1.42% 1.32% 
Observations 13,102 13,491 12,157 12,281 
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Table 8: Days Required by Active Investors to Correct Their Incorrect Trading Decision 
on High-distraction Days 
The table reports the net buy–sell imbalance (IMB) for active investors in the pre– and post–
announcement window on days with the most announcement distractions (D5) for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks (S1) only. Active investors are divided into 10 groups based on 
the numbers of trades conducted each year, where the first decile has the ‘most active’ active 
investors and the 10th (or last) decile has the ‘least active’ active investors. IMB on post-
announcement event days is reported for every successive day after earnings announcement, 
including the day of announcement. Earnings surprise is calculated using a random walk model 
and the pre-announcement window is [-15, -1] days before earnings announcement. For the t-
statistics *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
Days with most announcement distractions (D5) and extreme negative earnings surprise quintile 
(S1)  
  1st decile 
(10% ‘most 
active’ active 
investors ) 
10th decile 
(10% ‘least active’ 
active investors) 
 Average ‘n’ trades per 
year 
n > 70 47 < n < 54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMB in 
Pre–announcement 
window 
[–15, –1] 
–0.1121** 0.0921* 
Days after earnings announcement: 
0 days –0.0163** 0.1361* 
+1 day 0.0921* 0.1420 
+2 days 0.1543* 0.1415** 
+3 days 0.0813** 0.1332** 
+4 days 0.0731* 0.0837 
+5 days 0.0101 0.1106* 
+6 days 0.0213* 0.0729** 
+7 days –0.0095** 0.0691* 
+8 days –0.0121* 0.0663 
+9 days –0.0231* 0.0124** 
+10 days –0.129 –0.1094* 
+11 days –0.1303* –0.1929* 
+12 days –0.1505* –0.2212 
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Figure 1: Days Required by Active Investors to Correct Their Incorrect Trading Decision 
on High-distraction Days 
The figure shows the net buy–sell imbalance (IMB) for active investors in the pre- and post-
announcement window on days with the most announcement distractions (D5) for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks (S1). IMB is shown for the highest and lowest active investor 
deciles for each successive post-announcement event days after earnings announcement, 
including the day of announcement. Active investors are divided into 10 groups based on the 
numbers of trades conducted each year, where the first decile has the ‘most active’ active 
investors and the 10th (or last) decile has the ‘least active’ active investors. Earnings surprise is 
calculated using a random walk model and the pre-announcement window is [–15, –1] days 
before the earnings announcement. 
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Figure 2: Buy–Sell Imbalance (IMB) Evolution for Topmost Active Investor Decile: Stocks 
With and Without Analyst Coverage 
The figure shows the net buy–sell for the topmost active investor decile during the pre- and post-
announcement windows on days with the most announcement distractions (D5) for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks (S1). The blue (top) line depicts trading for stocks with no 
analyst coverage and the green (bottom) line is trading evolution for stocks that are covered by 
analysts. IMB is shown for each successive post-announcement event days after the earnings 
announcement, including the day of announcement. Earnings surprise is calculated using a 
random walk model and the pre-announcement window is [–15, –1] days before the earnings 
announcement. 
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Table 9: Net Buy-Sell in Pre- and Post-announcement Windows: Analyst Forecast 
Earnings Surprise 
The table reports the net buy–sell in the pre- and post-announcement windows for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks (S1) and extreme positive earnings surprise stocks (S5) in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The low-distraction quintile D1 contains stocks with 
announcement on days with the lowest number of other competing announcements and the high-
distraction quintile D5 contains stocks with announcements on days with the highest number of 
other competing announcements. Earnings surprise is calculated using analysts’ forecasts. The 
‘before’ event window is a pre-announcement window [–15, –1] days before the earnings 
announcement; the ‘short’ post-announcement event window is [0, +3] days after the 
announcement; and the ‘long’ event window is [+4, +15] days after the earnings announcement. 
For the t-statistics *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. 
 (A)  (B) 
 Extreme negative earnings 
surprise stocks (S1)  
 Extreme positive earnings surprise 
stocks (S5) 
Active 
traders 
High-
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Active 
traders 
High-
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Event 
window 
 
 
Lowest 
distraction 
quintile (D1) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–
0.0961*** 
–0.1732 0.2039***  0.1530*** 0.1029 0.0732* 
Short [0, +3] –0.1923** 0.1272 0.2124***  0.2148*** 0.2142 0.2023** 
Difference 
(short –before) 
–0.0962** 0.3004 0.0585***  –0.0405** 0.1113 0.1291* 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–0.0832 0.1521 0.1563  0.2593** 0.3193 0.1399** 
Difference 
(long – 
before) 
0.0129*** 0.0325 –0.0515**  0.0442** 0.2164 0.0667** 
         
 
 
Highest 
Distraction 
quintile (D5) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–
0.1523*** 
0.1346 –0.0341**  0.0982** 0.2491* –0.0582* 
Short [0, +3] 0.1413* 0.2241 0.1831***  0.0712** 0.1372 –0.0927** 
Difference 
(short –before) 
0.2936** 0.0896 0.2172**  –0.0270* –0.1119 –0.0345** 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–
0.1413*** 
0.1461 0.0865**  0.1920*** 0.0938 0.1932** 
Difference 
(long – 
before) 
0.0891 0.0162 0.1206***  0.2838** –0.1553 0.2514* 
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Table 10: Net Buy–Sell in Pre- and Post-Announcement Windows for Distractions in 
Similar Industries: Intra-industry Distractions 
The table reports the net buy–sell in the pre- and post-announcement window for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks (S1) and extreme positive earnings surprise stocks (S5) in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively, for distractions from similar industries (intra-industry 
distraction). The low-distraction quintile D1 contains stocks with announcement on days with 
the lowest number of other competing announcements and the high-distraction quintile D5 
contains stocks with announcement on days with the highest number of other competing 
announcements. Distraction quintiles are based solely on announcements in similar industries on 
a given day. Industries are classified using the six-digit North American Industrial Classification 
System. Earnings surprise is calculated using a random walk model. The ‘before’ event window 
is a pre-announcement window [–15, –1] days before earnings announcement; the ‘short’ post-
announcement event window is [0, +3] days after the earnings announcement; and the ‘long’ 
event window is [+4, +15] days after the announcement. For the t-statistics *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (A)  (B) 
 Extreme negative earnings 
surprise stocks (S1)  
 Extreme positive earnings surprise 
stocks (S1) 
Active 
traders 
High–
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Active 
traders 
High–
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Event 
window 
 
 
Lowest 
distraction 
quintile (D1) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–
0.1691*** 
0.1320 –0.0349**  0.1981*** 0.2193* 0.1754*** 
Short [0, +3] –0.1531** 0.0823 –0.0483*  0.1463* 0.1392 0.1839* 
Difference 
(short –before) 
0.0161** –0.0497 –0.0134**  –0.1318** –0.0801* 0.0785** 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–0.1423* 0.1151 0.1701*  0.2221** 0.2313* 0.1521** 
Difference 
(long – before) 
0.0268* –0.0107 0.2051*  0.004** 0.0121 –0.0233 
         
 
 
Highest 
distraction 
quintile (D5) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–0.0489 
*** 
0.0728* 0.1848**  0.0929** –0.1718 0.2048*** 
Short [0, +3]  0.1008* 0.1351 0.1031  0.0381* 0.0927 0.2190* 
Difference 
(short –before) 
–0.0519* 0.0623 –0.0817**  –0.0548* 0.2645 0.1203 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–0.1935* 0.1123 0.0237*  0.2018** 0.1772 0.1429* 
Difference 
(long – before) 
–0.1446* 0.0395 –0.1611  0.1089** 0.3009 –0.1535 
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Table 11: Net Buy–Sell in Pre- and Post-Announcement Windows for Distractions in 
Different Industries: Inter-industry Distractions 
The table reports the net buy–sell in pre- and post-announcement window for extreme negative 
earnings surprise stocks (S1) and extreme positive earnings surprise stocks (S5), in Panel A and 
Panel B, respectively, for distractions from distinctly different industries (inter-industry 
distraction). The low-distraction quintile D1 contains stocks with announcement on days with 
the lowest number of other competing announcements and the high-distraction quintile D5 
contains stocks with announcement on days with the highest number of other competing 
announcements. Distraction quintiles are based solely on announcements from distinct industries 
on a given day. Industries are classified using the six-digit North American Industrial 
Classification System. Earnings surprise is calculated using a random walk model. The ‘before’ 
event window is a pre-announcement window [–15, –1] days before the earnings announcement; 
the ‘short’ post-announcement event window is [0, +3] days after the announcement; and the 
‘long’ event window is [+4, +15] days after the announcement. For the t-statistics *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (A)  (B) 
 Extreme negative earnings 
surprise stocks (S1)  
 Extreme positive earnings surprise 
stocks (S5) 
Active 
traders 
High-
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Active 
traders 
High-
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Event window 
 
 
Lowest 
distraction 
quintile (D1) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–0.1923* 0.0383 0.1237**  0.1281** 0.2019* 0.1211** 
Short [0, +3] –0.1828 0.1192 0.2031*  0.1937* 0.2122 0.2028 
Difference 
(short –before) 
0.0095 0.0809 0.2068*  0.0756** 0.0103 0.1017* 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
0.1939** 0.1047 0.1983*  0.1137* 0.1772 0.2239** 
Difference 
(long – before) 
0.3862* 0.0664 –0.0421  –0.0114* –0.0247 0.0128* 
         
 
 
Highest 
distraction 
quintile (D5) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–0.1578 0.2562 0.2013*  0.2115* 0.2212* 0.1273* 
Short [0, +3] 0.1623* 0.1938* 0.1836  0.1038 0.1274 0.1238* 
Difference 
(short –before) 
–0.3201 –0.0624 0.0077  –0.1877 –0.0939 –0.0411 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–
0.1931** 
0.1423 0.1051**  0.2539** 0.1928 0.1923** 
Difference 
(long – before) 
–0.3509* –0.1417 –0.1962**  –0.0376** –0.0284 0.0551* 
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Table 12: Net Buy–Sell in Pre- and Post-Announcement Windows for Stocks Held by 
Investors at the Time of an Earnings Announcement 
The table reports the net buy–sell in pre- and post-announcement window for extreme 
negative earnings surprise stocks (S1) and extreme positive earnings surprise stocks (S5) in 
Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The investor subset is limited to those that held stock at 
the time of the earnings announcements. The low-distraction quintile D1 contains stocks with 
announcement on days with the lowest number of other competing announcements and the 
high-distraction quintile D5 contains stocks with announcement on days with the highest 
number of other competing announcements. Earnings surprise is calculated using a random 
walk model. The ‘before’ event window is a pre-announcement window [–15, –1] days 
before the earnings announcement; the ‘short’ post-announcement event window is [0, +3] 
days after the earnings announcement; and the ‘long’ event window is [+4, +15] days after 
the announcement. For the t-statistics *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance levels, respectively. 
 (A)  (B) 
 Extreme negative earnings 
surprise stocks (S1)  
 Extreme positive earnings surprise 
stocks (S1) 
Active 
traders 
High-
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Active 
traders 
High-
capital 
traders 
General 
traders 
 Event 
window 
 
 
Lowest 
distraction 
quintile (D1) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–
0.0721** 
0.1332 0.1647  0.16220*** 0.0927 0.1932* 
Short [0, +3] –0.2037* 0.1059 0.1981**  0.2112** 0.1192 0.1023** 
Difference 
(short –
before) 
–
0.1316** 
–0.0273 0.1334*  0.1321** 0.0265 –0.0912** 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
–0.1032 0.1928 0.1293*  0.1918** 0.2131 0.2213** 
Difference 
(long – 
before) 
–
0.0311** 
0.0566 –0.0857*  0.0982** 0.2214 0.1527** 
         
 
 
Highest 
distraction 
quintile (D5) 
Before [–15, –
1] 
–
0.2672** 
0.2445 0.1462**  0.1182** 0.2102 0.1023* 
Short [0, +3] 0.1814* 0.2524 0.1623*  0.1038 0.1922 0.1928* 
Difference 
(short –
before) 
–
0.0858** 
–0.0079 0.0161*  –0.0144 –0.018 0.0905 
Long [+4, 
+15] 
0.1042** 0.1623 0.0933**  0.2192** 0.1321 0.1342** 
Difference 
(long – 
before) 
0.3714* –0.0822 –0.0529**  0.1012** –0.0781 0.0319** 
 
